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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant/
vs.
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R. MONT EVANS and JANET
ROSE,
Defendants/Respondents.

]
]1

Case No. 870454

]

RESPONDENT EVANS' PETITION FOR REHEARING

On Appeal from the Memorandum Decision and Order
of the District Court of the Third Judicial District
for Salt Lake County/ State of Utah

This petition seeks a rehearing or, more accurately, a
hearing with full briefing and argument on the significant
constitutional issue of whether the Utah Legislature is truly
the judge of all issues pertaining to the disqualification of
its members regardless of the purpose or legal consequence
attendant to the determination of such issues.
This petition for rehearing simply makes three points:
First, the lower court correctly decided the
legislative branch and not the judicial branch had the
constitutional power to determine the separation of power
issues pertaining to Mr. Evans* qualifications as a legislator,
regardless of whether those separation of power issues were
being determined for the purpose of seating Mr. Evans in the
Legislature or continuing his employment in the executive
branch.
Second, this Court did not decide the issue presented
in this appeal in State v. Evans, 735 P.2d 29 (Utah 1986)
(MEvans IH) in that original action.

Since the holding of

Evans I was simply that the legislative branch had the power to
determine issues of disqualification for the purpose of
seating, the question of which branch, the legislative branch
or the judicial branch, had the power to determine such issue
for the purpose of employment was not briefed or passed upon by
the Court.
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Third, that summary disposition, without full briefing
and argument, is a disservice to the significance of the
question presented and the deference that could be shown to
legislative interest by providing a full hearing before the
Legislature's power to determine issues of disqualification is
eroded and undermined by judicial fiat.
1.
correct.

The lower court's decision W9§ constitutionally

The Constitution makes the Legislature the "judge" of

the "qualification of its members".

If the Legislature is to

be the judge of its members' qualifications, it has the power
to decide all issues pertaining to their disqualification.
That is not only the logic of the power conferred, that is what
this Court explicitly held in Evans I.
Separation of power issues, the issues germane to the
question of disqualification of Respondent Evans, have a
two-edged blade.

Separation of power constraints can preclude

service in the Legislature or, on the other side, employment in
the executive branch.

The blade may have two edges but the

point of inquiry or the question of disqualification is the
same.

Does the elected representative's simultaneous service

run afoul of the separation of power prohibitions of the
Constitution?

The issue of disqualification is identical

regardless of whether the issue is determined for the purpose
of seating or for the purpose of employment.
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Since the Legislature is charged with being the
"judge" on all issues of disqualification, the judicial branch
should not, as this Court has directed in its minute order
without explanation, usurp that constitutional function.

The

Court would usurp the power of the Legislature to determine all
issues of disqualification if it reaches the merits of the
separation of power issues in this case because (1) it would
decide on the merits the very issue the Legislature has decided
in the case of Mr. Evans and (2) while it will not decide that
issue for the purpose of seating, the determination of the same
separation of power issue for the purpose of employment will
undermine the prior legislative determination by now having the
judicial branch say whether Mr. Evans cannot constitutionally
do what the Legislature previously has said could be done.
In short, when the Legislature is charged with being
the "judge" of all issues pertaining to disqualification, the
Legislature and not the courts exercise the judicial power of
the State of Utah.

That is not only sound analysis, that is

precisely the point this Court made in Ellison v. Barnes, 23
Utah 183, 63 P. 899, 901 (1901) when it stated:
The power thus given to the houses of the
legislature is a judicial power, and each house
acts in a judicial capacity when it exerts it.
The express vesting of the judicial power in a
particular case so closely and vitally affecting
the body to whom that power is given takes it out
of the general judicial power.
I£. at 901.
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2.

This Court in Evans I did not reach and did not

decide that the judicial branch had constitutional power to
determine separation of power issues pertaining to

disqualification if those issues were raised fpr the purpose of
determining the legality of the legislator's employment with
the executive branch.

This Court held in Evans I that the

Legislature had the power to determine all issues of
disqualification including separation of power issues
pertaining to the elected representative for the purpose of
seating.

It did not decide that the judicial branch rather

than the legislative branch had the power to determine that
same precise issue —

for the purpose of employment.

Evans I was an original action in this Court in the
nature of an extraordinary writ.

The Attorney General did ask

this Court to determine the merits of the separation of power
issue with regard to Mr. Evans, an issue that had been
previously determined by the Legislature/ for the purpose of
terminating Mr. Evans' employment.
so.

The Court refused to do

The Court said:
We believe the latter question should not be
resolved in this proceeding for an extraordinary
writ even though we have jurisdiction to do so.

State v. Evans, 735 P.2d 29, 33 (Utah 1987)
The Court's statement in Evans I is ambiguous.

It may

be read# as the Attorney General argues, that the Court has the
power to determine the separation of power issues pertaining to
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Particularly, why would the

Court decide the question of constitutional jurisdiction between
the legislative branch and judicial branch when the adjudication
of that particular question was not necessary to its holding
that the Legislature had the constitutional power to determine
all issues pertaining to Mr. Evans' disqualification for the
purpose of seating.
Second, the question of whether the judicial or
legislative branch had the power to decide the issues pertaining
to Mr. Evans' disqualification for the purpose of termination of
his employment were not briefed in Evans I.

Read the briefs.

Why would this Court reach out to decide a major constitutional
issue, an issue that has been decided differently in other
jurisdictions, without brief or argument?

Compare Fowler v.

Bostick, 108 S.E.2d 720 (Ga. 1959) with Monaahan v. School Dist.
No. 1, 315 P.2d 797 (Ore. 1957).
3«
disposition.

This matter is not a matter for summary
Mr. Evans' position is supported by fair analysis

and authority.

Counsel respectfully suggests that the Court

should gain the benefit of the full adversary process before
deciding an important question.
The issue that this Court summarily decided is an issue
with regard to the division of power between the legislative
branch and the judicial branch.

Certainly questions of that
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decide the issues of disqualification for the purpose of
seating, would be worthy for consideration by this Court.

The

Court did not consider those issues in Evans
not granted the parties an opportunity to brief and argue those
should do so.

The petition for rehearing

should be granted.
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